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This study examines the determinants of the price-cost margins in the Turkish manufacturing 
industry spanning from 1995 to 2003. The literature on this subject points to the importance of 
market structure, business cycles and input costs. Utilizing panel data econometric techniques on 
a large number of manufacturing firms by conditioning on their firm size, age, ownership and 
export orientation, the study finds that there exists a marked difference among the firms’ pricing 
behaviors according to their market share. Import penetration seems to be ineffective to reduce 
the price-cost margins of large, high market share and foreign partner firms, while exporting 
activity was observed to act as a factor to enhance competition. The analysis also suggests that 
price-cost margins behave pro-cyclically in general and an appreciation of the domestic currency 
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I. Introduction 
Turkey  has  initiated  an  extensive  structural  adjustment  program  in  1980,  which  aimed  at 
integrating with the international commodity and financial markets. The main motive behind this 
attempt has been to overcome the foreign exchange constraints led by a long period of inward 
looking,  import  substitutionist  industrialization  policies,  which  have  already  turned  out  to  be 
unsustainable by late 1970s. In January 1980, the declaration of the “stabilization and economic 
liberalization program” has marked the transformation of the economy from domestic demand 
oriented import substitutionist industrialization (ISI), in which import competing industries have 
been highly protected by a strictly regulated import regime, to export-oriented industrialization 
strategy. During 1980s, the quantitative restrictions on imports were gradually eliminated and the 
fixed exchange rate regime was replaced with a flexible regime of crawling peg. The introduction 
of a complex system of export subsidization and tax incentives has been the main policy tool to 
promote exports during this period.
1 The post-1980 reform process has been, to a great extent, 
completed  by  the  financial  liberalization  introduced  in  1989,  which  involved  the  full 
convertibility of the Turkish lira and the removal of all controls on foreign capital flows. This 
process,  nevertheless,  led  to  abrupt  mini  boom-bust  cycles  throughout  the  1990s,  which  are 
characterized by the short-term capital flows.  
The post-1980 policy reforms have turned the Turkish economy into a completely open one, with 
a substantial increase in the foreign trade volume. The structure of the manufacturing industry has 
also undergone significant changes characterized by the increasing volume of exports. Within its 
new  frame,  the  manufacturing  industry  was  supposed  to  become  the  main  sector  to  lead  the 
export orientation of the economy. In addition to this, liberalizing the foreign trade regime by the 
elimination of the import restrictions was expected to increase competition in the commodity 
markets and remove excess profit margins endemic in the manufacturing industry. Nonetheless, 
contrary to the expectation of orthodox theory, as evidenced by a number of empirical researches, 
trade liberalization process in Turkey failed to increase competition, and oligopolistic mark-up 
pricing behavior has been maintained along with the high level of concentration in the industrial 
commodity markets. 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed examination of the post-1980 reform period, see e.g., Ersel (1991), Uygur (1993), Köse and 
Yeldan (1998a and 1988b), Ekinci (1998), Metin-Özcan et al. (1999), Voyvoda and Yeldan (1999), Boratav et al. 
(2000).   2
Price-cost margins are generally considered as one of the main indicators reflecting imperfections 
in product markets. Among the most important of these imperfections is the lack of competition, 
leading to oligopolistic market structures wherein firms charge prices over their marginal costs. A 
number of structural variables such as firm size, concentration, export intensity, entry rates or 
tariff rates might be the sources of excess profits in the markets. Therefore, it is claimed that trade 
liberalization will enhance competitiveness and remove excess profit margins by way of reducing 
market power of domestic firms operating in oligopolistic markets.  
Some empirical studies examining the effect of trade liberalization on price-cost margins for the 
Turkish manufacturing industry (Forouton (1991) and Engin et al. (1995)) reach the conclusion 
that  import  penetration  has  disciplined  the  domestic  market  by  lowering  costs and price-cost 
margins  of  oligopolistic  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  Yalçın  (2000)  finds  that,  while  import 
penetration has led to a reduction in the price-cost margins of the overall private sector, it has led 
to  an  increase  in  the  price-cost  margins  of  more  concentrated  industries  in  private  sector. 
Similarly, Metin-Özcan et al. (2000) find that openness had very little impact on the levels of 
profit margins (mark-ups) and conclude that the manufacturing industry displays a resistance to 
increased  competition  despite  the  import  discipline  brought  by  the  post-1980  liberalization 
program.  Moreover,  profit  margins  of  trade  adjusting  sectors  that  were  classified  as  inward-
looking in 1980, and became open by mid-1990s respond positively to openness. 
The  bulk  of  the  studies  examining  the  behavior  of  price-cost  margins  in  the  Turkish 
manufacturing have generally focused on the impacts of trade liberalization. In this study, we 
analyze  the  behavior  of  price-cost  margins  taking  into  account  a  wider  range  of  structural 
variables, in addition to import penetration, such as market share, export sales, labor productivity, 
as  well  as  some  other  variables  like  financial  position,  cyclicality,  interest  income  and  real 
exchange rates. The sample period covers 1995 to 2003. This period is of particular importance 
since 1995 marks the joining of Turkey to the customs union with the EU, which rendered the 
foreign trade regime even more liberal and increased competitive pressures. We also split the 
sample period into two periods, namely 1995-2000, and 2001-2003 to gauge the effects of the 
2001 economic crisis, especially in the post-crisis period. Another purpose of the study is to shed 
light  on  the  inflationary  dynamics  in  Turkey  by  examining  the  pricing  behaviors  of  the 
manufacturing firms.    3
This  study  analyzes  the  determinants  of  the  manufacturing  firms’  price  cost  margins  in  the 
context of structure-performance framework by using a large panel of data on manufacturing 
firms compiled by the Central Bank of Turkey. The study finds that market share appears to be 
one of the most important determinants of the price-cost margins, as suggested by the theory. 
According to our econometric findings, import penetration proves to be inefficient to increase 
competition  in  the  domestic  commodity  markets,  while  exporting  activity  improves 
competitiveness.  Given  the  considerable  dependence  of  the  Turkish  industrial  production 
structure on imported inputs, real exchange rate appreciation appears to significantly lower price-
cost margins through reducing input costs. Interest income that firms acquire generally affects 
price-cost  margins  positively,  whereas  an  increase  in indebtness of a firm happens to reduce 
price-cost  margins.  The  econometric  findings  of  the  study  suggest  a  negative  relationship 
between labor productivity and price-cost margins. The remainder of the study is organized as 
follows: Second section summarizes some observations on the Turkish manufacturing industry 
during 1995-2003. In section three, we present the theoretical background, source of the data and 
econometric  methodology.  An  analysis  of  the  empirical  results  is  presented  in  section  four. 
Finally, section five concludes. 
II. Some Observations on the Turkish Manufacturing Industry During 1995-2003
2 
In this section, we present some general characteristics of the Turkish manufacturing industry 
after 1995. Figure 1 reveals that price-cost margins of the overall manufacturing industry display 
a  declining  trend  for  the  1995-2003  period.  This  feature  is  more  pronounced  for  large,  high 
market share, exporter and foreign partner firms, whereas price-cost margins of small and young 
firms  exhibit  a  more  moderate  decline  (See  Table  1  and  Table  2  for  the  classification  and 




                                                 
2  The great majority of the firms sample consists of private firms. Therefore, the analysis in this study indeed reflects 
the properties of the private firms.   4
Table 1: The Classification of Firms 
Small  Firms that employ less than 50 workers. 
Large  Firms that employ more than 250 workers. 
Young  Firms those are younger than 17 years as of 2000. 
High Market 
Share 
Firms  whose  sale  ratio  to  the  relevant  sector’s  sales  take  place  in  the 
upper 50 percentile of the distribution. 
Exporter  Firms whose export-sale ratio exceeds 25 percent over the period. 
FDI  Firms those have foreign partners or owned by foreigners. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Firms According to their Classification 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporter  FDI  PUB 
Small  1021             
Large  -  393           
Young  565  104  1208         
HMS  29  199  118  391       
Exporter  211  178  445  123  836     
FDI  25  76  84  88  75  196   
PUB  -  6  2  2  -  -  9 
                 Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations. 
                 Note: Since a firm can take place in more than one classification, the sums may not add up. 
Exporter firms, on average, have relatively lower price-cost margins, with the lowest level in 
2003. This observation is in contrast with Görg and Warzynski (2003), which employs a similar 
analytical approach as ours, finds that exporter firms have higher mark-ups than non-exporters 
using  company  level  data  for  UK  manufacturing  industry.  In  fact,  labor  productivity  gains 
especially after 2001, along with real appreciation of the domestic currency and the decline in 
real wages, induced exporter firms in Turkey to charge lower mark-ups, which was critical to 
preserve or even increase their market shares (Table A2). 
   5
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Note: PCM, CYCL, IMP and EXPSH denote price-cost margins, sectoral business cycle, import 
penetration rate and export share, respectively.
3 
Small firms have lower price-cost margins compared to large and high market share firms. This 
result  confirms  the  positive  association  between  market  power  and  price-cost  margins  in  the 
Turkish  manufacturing  industry  as  suggested  often  by  the  theory.  Our  market  structure 
classification of small and large firms is analogous to Martins et al.’s (1996) fragmented and 
segmented sectors, which reflect relative firm size, a proxy for the existence of size advantages, 
such as scale economies at the firm level. Small firm category reflects an industry, which is closer 
to  a  state  of  perfect  competition  (fragmented  industry),  while  large  firm  category  reflects  an 
industry where concentration remains relatively stable (segmented industry). In that sense, these 
observations are consistent with those of Martins et al. (1996), which finds that mark-ups tend to 
be  lower  in  fragmented  industries  than  in  segmented  industries.  Our  high  market  share  firm 
classification,  on  the  other  hand,  reflects  the  most  concentrated  firms  in  the  manufacturing 
industry. These firms appear to have higher price-cost margins most probably due to their high 
market power (Table 3).  
                                                 
3 See Table 4 in Section III.2 for the definitions of the variables.   6
 
Table 3: Price-Cost Margins  
   All Firms  Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  9.4  8.2  12.3  7.1  12.7  9.3  13.1 
1996  8.4  7.2  10.6  6.6  11.0  8.0  13.0 
1997  7.5  6.7  9.8  5.9  10.1  6.7  12.2 
1998  7.0  6.1  8.8  5.7  9.1  5.9  10.7 
1999  6.7  6.3  7.4  5.7  8.0  6.0  9.6 
2000  6.1  5.6  7.0  5.8  7.8  5.2  9.5 
2001  7.1  6.2  8.8  6.4  8.9  7.4  11.3 
2002  7.0  6.2  8.6  5.9  9.0  6.8  10.6 
2003  5.8  5.3  7.5  5.2  7.6  4.8  9.1 
1995-2003  7.2  6.4  9.0  6.0  9.4  6.7  11.0 
            Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
Among firm groups, foreign partner firms emerge to have the highest price-cost margins over the 
1995-2003 period. They also have high market shares (Table A2). This observation implies that, 
multinational firms generally tend to build partnership with highly concentrated domestic firms 
and/or domestic firms with high market power prefer to merge with a foreign firm and emerge as 
the exclusive retailer of a specific good in the domestic market. Actually, Table A3 shows that 
foreign partner firms that are located in the industry have rather high import penetration rates. 
Young firms represent similarities with small firms in terms of the behavior of their price-cost 
margins and market shares. The fact that young firms tend to have relatively lower price-cost 
margins implies that they avoid losing their market shares against new entrants into the markets. 
Relatively low levels of import penetration and export share levels of young firms indicate that 
the markets in which they operate are quite competitive (Tables A3 and A5). In addition, young 
firms’ low level of labor productivity occurs as one of the factors that constrains higher price-cost 
margins (Table A6). 
All  firm  groups  seem  to  have  reduced  their  productions  considerably  following  the  deep 
economic recession that occurred in February 2001 (Table A1). That is the main reason that lies 
behind the marked increase in price-cost margins in 2001, since we define price-cost margins as 
the ratio of gross profit of a firm to its net sales. By 2003, although the negative output gap is 
getting narrower, the whole manufacturing industry continues to operate below potential output. 
While  the  extent  of  cyclicality  changes  according  to  different  classes  of  firms,  the  cyclical 
behavior is quite prevalent across all sectors. The reaction of foreign partner firms to business   7
cycle  is  the  most  acute,  whereas  exporter  firms  respond  relatively  more  moderately.  This 
phenomenon reflects the differences in the production destinations of these two groups of firms; 
foreign partner firms come across more domestic market oriented, while exporter firms can more 
effectively protect themselves from the negative impacts of economic downturns. 
As for the interest income, foreign partner firms represent the most appealing features in the 
sense that they have the highest interest income throughout 1995-2003 (Table A4). This situation 
is simply a result of the fact that these firms come up as the major holders of high interest bearing 
assets, specifically government borrowing securities. The same observation applies to large and 
high market share firms as well. The rise in interest income is more salient especially during 
recession years across all groups of firms, when the domestic borrowing interest rates reached to 
relatively high levels. These observations suggest that a large fraction of manufacturing firms 
(especially those who have high market power) in Turkey tend to invest in interest bearing assets 
including government domestic borrowing securities and earn considerable interest income. 
It is observed that high market share firms along with foreign partner firms have the highest labor 
productivity during the 1995-2003 period (Table A6). This is mostly due to the fact that high 
market share firms take advantage of economies of scale. As for the foreign partner firms, greater 
access to knowledge about technology, more intense R&D activities, and management techniques 
as well as capital enables these firms to reach to higher level of labor productivity. Hallward-
Driemeier  et  al.  (2002)  also  find  that,  firms  that  are  foreign-owned  or  particularly  those 
controlled by foreign owners in East Asia tend to have higher productivity compared to domestic 
firms – even after controlling for other variables. 
III. Theoretical Background, Data and Econometric Methodology 
Starting with Bain (1941), many analytical and empirical studies have been carried out to solve 
the  relationship  between  market  structure  and  performance  (seller  concentration  and 
profitability). Bain has tested the structure-conduct-performance relationship empirically by the 
hypothesis, which accepts the systematic positive relationship between seller concentration and 
excess profits in the long run. He has suggested that concentration and entry barriers together 
serve to raise the profitability of the large firms. Entry barriers, economies of scale, absolute 
capital  requirements  and  product  differentiation  separate  the  firm  within  the  industry  from   8
potential entrants outside the industry. Many empirical studies that were carried out after Bain 
have  confirmed  the  hypothesis  that  higher  seller  concentration  results  in  higher  excess  profit 
rates, which are accepted as indicator of market power (Martin (1993)). 
III. 1. Theoretical Background 
Suppose that market consists of oligopolistic firms and these firms exhibit Cournot behavior. It is 
assumed that a firm does not change its output initially in response to an output change by a rival 
firm. In this case, the firm maximizes its profit with respect to its output assuming the rival firm 
will not change its output level. The profit of oligopolistic firm is defined as follows: 
 
  Πi = pQi-ciQi,                (1) 
 
where Qi, ci and p indicate the output of firm i, variable cost and the market price, respectively, 
and the market price is a function of total outputs of n firms. 
 
  p = f(Q1+Q2+....+Qn)              (2) 
 
Maximizing (1) with respect to Qi will give the equilibrium condition for the firm i, 
 
  δΠi/δQi = 0,                (3) 
 
With some manipulations the following equation is obtained: 
 
  Li = (p-µi)/p = (1/εd)Qi/Q            (4) 
 
Averaging over n firms both sides of the equation (4), the industry level equation is obtained in 
the following form: 
 
  L = (p-µ)/p= Hd/εd              (5)   9
 
where L and Li indicate the Lerner index of the monopoly power of the whole industry and of the 
firm i, respectively, and µ, µi, Hd and εd indicate the marginal cost of the industry, marginal cost 
of  firm  i,  Herfindahl  index  of  concentration,  and  domestic  price  elasticity  of  demand, 
respectively. Hd indicates the sum of the squares of the share of firms in the industry output. 
Assume that the average cost is equal to the marginal cost, then Lerner index in equation (5) 
would  be  transformed  to  a  profitability  index,  namely  price-cost  margin.  In  this  framework, 
equation (5) confirms the price-cost margin has a positive relationship with concentration ratio, 
Hd,  and  a  negative  relationship  with  the  price  elasticity  of  domestic  demand.  Note  that  this 
relationship is based on the Cournot assumption. 
Empirical studies about the structure-performance relationship suggested that firms are able to 
exercise some market power by means of product differentiation and other entry barriers. In this 
case, the market concentration may be considered as a measure of domestic competition, but it 
does not measure the actual competition that is affected by foreign trade. 
The role of monopolistic and imperfect competitive market structure in terms of foreign trade has 
been recently discussed in the context of the theory of international trade. Increase in the share of 
the multinational firms in world trade and in the supply of the differentiated goods and services 
which  are  produced  under  the  conditions  of  decreasing  costs,  externalities  and  the  imperfect 
competitive  structure,  have  altered  the  scope  of  the  trade  theory  substantially  (Helpman  and 
Krugman (1986)). 
It is commonly claimed that foreign trade liberalization increases the welfare of a country more 
under  imperfectly  competitive  domestic  market  because,  it  reduces  the  distortions  created  in 
imperfect  competitive  markets,  expands  market  size,  lowers  the  average  cost  by  constructing 
efficient-size firms and increases the division of labor in the context of the product differentiation 
and economies of scale (Helpman and Krugman (1986)). 
In monopoly models, the country liberalizing trade is assumed to be a small one that is price-taker 
and thus faces with a perfectly elastic import supply. In this case, the validity of the proposition 
that import competition generally limits market power depends on domestic costs. If the domestic   10
marginal cost is sufficiently low, the monopoly could use its monopoly power by charging a 
higher price that is equal or less than the import price including tariff and transportation cost and 
additional tariff increases the surplus of the monopolist in this situation and as a result, foreign 
trade would disappear completely. On the contrary, if the domestic costs are sufficiently high, 
then monopoly will adopt the same behavior with the competitive firms. And, if the domestic 
marginal cost is not extremely high and low, the monopoly can only exploit limited market power 
(Jacquemin (1982)).  
In the oligopoly model that has been suggested by Jacquemin (1982), it is assumed that products 
are homogeneous and firms exhibit Cournot behavior. Also, it is supposed that the import supply 
is perfectly inelastic, that is, the import supply does not respond to domestic prices. Under these 
conditions, the gross profit of oligopolistic firm i is formulated as follows: 
 
  Πi = f(Q+M) Qi-ciQi - Fi            (6) 
 
where Q, M and Fi indicate the total output, total import and fixed cost of firm i respectively and 
domestic price, p is formulated as: 
 
  p = f(Q+M),                (7) 
 
By maximizing equation (6) with respect to Qi, the equilibrium condition for firm i is obtained: 
 
  δΠi/δQi = 0,                (8) 
 
after some transformations, the following equation is obtained: 
 
  Li = (p-µi)/p = (1/εd).(Qi/Q).(Q/ (Q+M))        (9) 
 
and averaging over n firms of both sides of equation (9), the industry level equation is obtained as 
follows:   11
 
  L = (p-µ)/p = (Hd/εd).(1-tm)            (10) 
 
where tm is the import penetration rate (M/(Q+M). 
Assume that the average cost equals to the marginal cost, µ, then Lerner index in equation (10) 
transforms to the gross return on domestic sale that is the price-cost margin and equation (10) 
indicates that there is a negative relationship between price-cost margins and domestic demand 
elasticity that is considered as an indicator of potential competition and import penetration rate 
which is accepted commonly as an indicator of the actual import competition, and a positive 
relation between the price-cost margin and concentration ratio, namely Herfindahl index. 
If  import  supply  is  not  perfectly  inelastic  and  there  exists  still  a  Cournot  behavior  among 
domestic firms, then foreign firms that perceive domestic demand as being perfectly elastic are 
the potential competitors of domestic oligopolistic firms. Then, equation (10) is transformed to 
the following form: 
 
  L = (p-µ)/p = (Hd (1-tm))/(εd+γs.tm)          (11) 
 
where γs is the price elasticity of imports. 
In this case, import penetration interacts also with the price elasticity of imports in reducing the 
price-cost margin. In other words, high price elasticity of the imports enhances the impact of 
imports on price-cost margins. On the other hand, if the price of imports is perfectly elastic (i.e. if 
the  domestic  industry  is  price-taker  in  the  international  markets),  the  price-cost  margins  will 
disappear  completely.  In  this  framework,  the  price  elasticity  of  imports  is  also accepted as a 
measure of potential import competition (Jacquemin (1982)). 
III. 2. The Data 
We use around four thousand manufacturing firms’ balance sheets and income statements that 
have been gathered by the Central bank of the Republic of Turkey. The analysis covers the 1995-
2003  period.  The  data  set  includes  a  large  panel  of  information  on  assets  and  liabilities,   12
employment  and  sales,  profits  in  details.  We  merge  this  data  set  with  four-digit  ISIC 
(International Standard Industrial Classification) industry level statistics produced by the State 
Institute of Statistics to use industry level variables (i.e., concentration ratio, import share etc.) 
that we need but do not take place in our firm level data set. 
The definitions of the variables that we use in the econometric analysis are as follows: 
Table 4: Definitions of the Variables 
PCMit  Firm level price-cost margin; defined as the ratio of pre-tax profit to its net 
sales (percent). 
CYCLjt   Cyclicality; defined as a measure of the cycle based on the industrial output 
gap, which relates actual and trend sectoral output (percentage deviation from 
trend).
4 
MMSHjt  Market share; defined as the ratio of the amount of a specific firm’s sales to the 
whole sales of the relevant sector (per ten thousands). 
IMPjt  Import penetration; defined as the ratio of a sector’s imports to this sector’s 
amount of production (percent). 
INTINCSit   Interest  income;  defined  as  the  ratio  of a firm’s interest income to its sales 
(percent). 
EXPSHit  Export  share;  defined  as  the  ratio  of  a  specific  firm’s  exports  to  its  sales 
(percent). 
EMPPRit  Firm  level  labor  productivity;  defined  as  the  ratio  of  a  firm’s  output  to  its 
employment (deflated by a thousand). 
LEVERit   Firm leverage rate; defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets (percent) . 
RDKUFt   Real exchange rate, deflated by producer prices index (1995 base year). 
YDUM  Year dummies to control time varying unobserved effects.  
Note: i, j and t denote firm, sector and time, respectively. 
 
                                                 
4 Trend output for each sector was computed by using a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the output series of the relevant 
sector. The weighting factor for the filter was set at 100 (Martins et al. (1996)).   13
III. 3. Econometric Methodology 
We employ panel data methods to analyze the determinants of price-cost margins in the Turkish 
manufacturing industry. Panel data methods allow us to capture firm heterogeneity over time. 
Firm specific effects are omitted under the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) estimation which 
leads  to  biased  estimates  if  unobservable  individual  specific  effects  are  correlated  with  the 
explanatory variables in the model. 
A standard model of panel data is specified in the following form: 
yit=Xitβ +λt+αi + εit  (12) 
where i = 1,2,…., N refers to a cross section unit (firms in this study), t = 1,2,…..,T refers to time 
period.  yit  and  Xit    denote  dependent  variable  and  the  vector  of  non-stochastic  explanatory 
variables for the firm i and year t, respectively. λt represents firm-invariant time-specific effects, 
αi  is time invariant unobservable firm specific effects and εit are the disturbance terms that vary 
with time and across firms. Restrictive assumptions on the nature of firm specific-effects lead to 
various panel data models. The nature of the data and the specification of the model are important 
for  the  selection  of  an  estimation  method.  There  are  basically  two  main  panel  data  models, 
namely fixed effects and random effects.  
Under  the  random  effects  specification,  the  Generalised  Least  Square  estimates  are 
asymptotically efficient. On the other hand, the fixed effects estimates, which are more sensitive 
to the errors in variables are unbiased and consistent but not efficient. Unlike the fixed effects 
model, the estimates for random effects model will not be consistent if the individual effects are 
correlated with the independent variables. We rejected the hypothesis of no systematic difference 
between coefficients obtained from the random effects and fixed effects models by using the 
Hausman  test.  This  means  that  the  random  effects  estimates  are  efficient  but  not  consistent; 
therefore we use the method that gives consistent results which is the fixed effects model. Only 
results obtained from fixed effects estimations are interpreted in the next section, and reported in 
Appendix B.   14
In this study, an econometric structure-performance model of the Turkish manufacturing industry 
is  constructed  to  examine  the  determinants  of  price-cost  margins  (PCM)  in  the  Turkish 
manufacturing  industry  during  the  1995-2003  period.  In  this  context,  the  following  model  is 
estimated by utilizing fixed effects panel data method. 
  PCM = f(CYCL, MMSH, IMP, INTINCS, EXPSH, EMPPR, LEVER, RDKUF, YDUM)  (13) 
The model includes both firm, i and time, t dimensions. CYCL captures the effects of business 
cycles  on  price-cost  margins.  MMSH,  IMP  and  EXPSH  are  the  variables  that  reflect  market 
structure and openness of the firms. LEVER and INTINCS are firm specific variables that reflect 
financial position of the firms. EMPPR presents the productivity of labor. RDKUF is the real 
effective exchange rate and captures the non-labor cost component of a firm. YDUM denotes the 
year  dummies,  which  are  introduced  into  the  model  to  control  for  time  varying  unobserved 
effects. 
The  model  in  equation  (13)  has  been  extended  to  capture  firm  heterogeneity  concerning  the 
sample. In this framework, we use interaction terms along with the explanatory variables defined 
above to identify impacts of various firm types defined below. The model is defined as follows:  
  PCM = f(CYCL, CYCL*TYPE, MMSH, MMSH*TYPE, IMP, IMP*TYPE, INTINCS,  
  INTINCS*TYPE, EXPSH, EXPSH*TYPE, EMPPR, EMPPR*TYPE,  
  LEVER, LEVER *TYPE, RDKUF, RDKUF *TYPE, YDUM)  (14) 
Firm type dummies (TYPE) consist of eight different binary variables reflecting seven different 
firm characteristics i.e. small, large, young, high market share, export oriented, foreign partner 
and public firms. We could use only one dummy for each firm’s characteristic, namely the firm 
size to carry out our regressions. Instead, we used two dummies for each firm type to capture the 
reactions of firms in the tails of the distribution. For example, for the firm size, we carried out 
estimations by using interactions for both small and large firms as we did not intend to measure 
the reactions of the medium sized firms. This method enables us to identify the reaction of firms 
in the tails of firm distribution for a particular type of firm.   15
IV. Analysis of Econometric Results 
There are a number of researches analyzing the evolution of profit margins (or mark-ups) for the 
Turkish manufacturing industry (Özmucur (1992), Şahinkaya (1993), Boratav et al. (1994), Köse 
and Yeldan (1998b), Yalçın (2000)). It is observed that a large fraction of manufacturing industry 
consists  of  monopolistic  or  oligopolistic  market  structures,  and  mark-up  pricing  behavior  is 
prevalent  across  manufacturing  firms.  These  analyses  suggest  that,  contrary  to  the 
prognostications of the orthodox theory, trade liberalization did not in fact lead to a higher level 
competition and change the oligopolistic structure of the manufacturing industry. In this section, 
we present an analysis of the econometric results, which are tabulated in Appendix B. Our panel 
data regressions consists of a number of classifications of firms (presented in Table 1), which also 
reflect  the  market  structure  of  the  manufacturing  industry,  and  enable  us  to  examine  the 
determinants of price-cost margins. More specifically, we analyze the effects of some structural 
features of the manufacturing industry such as import penetration, market share, export sales, 
labor productivity, and some other variables such as cyclicality (business cycles), interest income, 
and real exchange rate on profit margins spanning from 1995 to 2003. 
We begin our analysis with the examination of the cyclical behavior of profit margins in the 
Turkish  manufacturing  industry.  Numerous  empirical  studies  provide  evidence  that  a 
considerable part of the price increases comes from the mark-up pricing behavior. In this sense, it 
is of importance to pinpoint the behavior of profit margins over the business cycles to envisage 
the behavior of prices in the short to medium run. Nevertheless, theoretical literature does not 
provide a clear-cut answer as to how mark-ups behave over the business cycles. Then, whether 
the mark-up is counter-cyclical or pro-cyclical turns out to be an empirical question. Martins et 
al. (1996) find counter-cyclical mark-ups in most cases of the sector-by-sector analysis for 14 
OECD  countries,  whereas  Small  (1997)  finds  pro-cyclical  mark-ups  for  UK  manufacturing 
industry and services, which suggests that price pressures increase during expansion periods and 
decrease during recessions.  
According to our econometric analysis, price-cost margins in the Turkish manufacturing industry 
are in general pro-cyclical. But the price-cost margins of small, young and exporter firms behave   16
rather in a counter-cyclical fashion (Tables B1-B4 in Appendix B).
5 These results suggest that, 
given their small market shares, small, exporter and young firms refrain increasing their prices 
during economic upturns with the concern to further lose their market shares. In addition, unlike 
large and high market share firms, which are more likely to hoard labor during the economic 
downturn,  small  and  young  firms  may  encounter  additional  labor  cost  caused  by  hiring  new 
workers  during  economic  recovery  (Cantor  (1990)  and  Sharpe  (1994)).  Our  findings  are,  in 
general, consistent with Onaran and Yentürk (2003), which finds that profit margins behave pro-
cyclically, while in contrast with Ceritoğlu (2002), which finds counter-cyclical mark-ups for the 
Turkish manufacturing industry. The fact that price-cost margins behave strong pro-cyclically for 
large and high market share firms leads us to the conclusion that, during expansionary periods, 
pricing  behavior  of  the  manufacturing  firms  in  general  occurs  as  a  significant  source  of 
inflationary process in Turkey. 
The econometric findings, in line with the structural performance theory, suggest that price-cost 
margins in general respond positively to an enlargement in the market share. However, when we 
consider the interaction terms that are introduced into the model to capture the effects of the 
variables on various firm groups, we face a somewhat mixed picture; an increase in the market 
share happens to affect firms’ price-cost margins negatively except for the young, exporter firms, 
and to a large extent small firms. The general conclusion arising from these findings is that, 
highly concentrated firms still have room to raise their profit margins by increasing their market 
shares. On the other, small, young and exporter firms seem to have no room to enlarge their 
market shares in order to raise profit margins. Actually, this outcome mostly drives from the fact 
that these firms operate relatively in a more competitive fashion. 
Sectoral import penetration rates seem to have created a positive impact on price-cost margins of 
the manufacturing firms in general when interaction terms are not considered. When we look at 
interaction terms, we observe that, by reducing the price-cost margins, imports have created a 
market disciplining effect only for small and young firms especially for the 2001-2003 period. On 
the contrary, this effect has been positive for large, exporter and foreign partner firms. Moreover, 
it is seen that import penetration has positively affected the price-cost margins of high market 
                                                 
5  We add up the coefficients of relevant variables and their interaction terms in order to assess the total impact of a 
variable on various firm groups.   17
share firms, especially throughout the 2001-2003 period. These results are not consistent with the 
import discipline hypothesis, since under the pressure of imports, it is expected that price-cost 
margins  would  decrease  especially  for  the  firms  that  have  market  power.  Nonetheless,  this 
phenomenon  might  be  the  result  of  mergers  among  domestic  and  foreign  firms  in  highly 
concentrated markets. Actually these three groups of firms, namely large, high market share and 
foreign partner firms occur to be the most concentrated. As a result, contrary to the expectations 
of the orthodox theory, these observations, similar to the findings of Yalçın (2000), Metin-Özcan 
et al. (2000) and Onaran and Yentürk (2003), suggest that trade liberalization in Turkey has not 
created  a  competitive  environment  enough  to  reduce  the  overall  price-cost  margins  in  the 
manufacturing industry. 
The interest income share that the firms acquire generally happens to have a positive effect on the 
price-cost margins over 1995-2003. This effect is the highest for high market share and large 
firms throughout 1995-2003 as their respective interaction terms are significantly positive. This 
fact  suggests  that,  especially  highly  concentrated  firms  have  considerably  invested  in  interest 
bearing assets, particularly government domestic borrowing securities, during this period when 
the average domestic borrowing interest rates stood at over 100 percent. As a result, we observe 
that, interest incomes have constituted a significant source of the profits of highly concentrated 
firms and helped them to maintain high levels of price-cost margins in the second half of 1990s 
thanks to their market power. On the other hand, we see a slightly different picture for small, 
young, exporter and foreign partner firms that have also positive coefficients in general but the 
impact  is  much  more  smaller  than  that  of  the  large  and  high  market  share  firms,  given  the 
negative coefficients estimated for their interaction terms. This observation has the implication 
that these groups of firms have invested to a lesser extent in interest bearing assets during this 
period,  or,  alternatively,  given  their  smaller  market  shares,  they  tended  to  make  use  of  their 
interest  incomes  to  charge  lower  price-cost  margins  in  order  to  enlarge  their  market  shares 
through price competition. When we consider the interaction terms for firm groups, the effect of 
interest income on price-cost margins turns out to be statistically insignificant for the majority of 
the groups of firms in the 2001-2003 period when the interest rates on government bonds have 
declined  considerably  compared  to  1995-2000.  This  observation  indicates  that  the  decline  in 
interest rates after 2001 has directed almost all groups of manufacturing firms to invest in their   18
normal  activity  of  production  rather  than  investing  in  high  interest  yielding  government 
securities. 
In general, theoretical analysis regarding the relationship between exports and profitability are 
ambiguous.  If  the  exporter  country  is  price-taker  and  the  demand  for  its  exports  is  perfectly 
elastic so that the export price of a good is equal to its world price, and the exporter cannot 
discriminate price among domestic and foreign markets, then exporting activity might increase 
the competitiveness of the domestic market by propelling non-competitive sectors to behave in a 
competitive way (Caves (1985)). The effect of an increase in the exporting activity is found to be 
significantly negative on price-cost margins of large, high market share and foreign partner firms 
during the period of 1995-2003. Given that these firm groups are more concentrated, exporting 
activity appears to increase the competitiveness in the domestic market by way of reducing price-
cost margins of these firms. 
Our econometric analysis, in general, suggests a negative impact of labor productivity on the 
price-cost margins during the period of 1995-2003. Small and young firms have decreased their 
price-cost  margins  throughout  1995-2000  in  response  to  an  improvement  in  their  labor 
productivities. Exporter firms, as well as foreign partner firms could also take advantage of labor 
productivity gains to reduce their profit margins and increase their competitiveness. Moreover, 
high  market  share  firms’  price-cost  margins  also  seem  to  be  affected  negatively  from  labor 
productivity. We are confronted with mixed results for large firms; while these firms increase 
their price-cost margins in the period of 1995-2000 in response to productivity gains, an inverse 
effect arises during the 2001-2003 period. This outcome seems mostly due to the competitive 
pressures coming from other groups of firms, especially during 2001-2003 when significant labor 
productivity increases were prevalent across almost all manufacturing firms. 
Leverage ratio, which reflects the indebtedness and the financial position of a firm, happens to 
decrease  the  price-cost  margins  of  all  groups  of  firms  in  general,  but  the  impact  is  less 
pronounced for small and young firms. These results indicate that firms in general sacrifice part 
of their profits to meet their obligations without encountering any financial distress. This result   19
also suggests that firms abstain to lose their market shares further by charging higher price-cost 
margins when they are highly leveraged.
6 
Real  appreciation  of  the  domestic  currency,  in  general,  leads  to  a  decline  in  the  price-cost 
margins. This effect is more pronounced in the 1995-2000 period, in which the real exchange rate 
has been generally overvalued. Especially, large and high market share firms’ price-cost margins 
exhibit a strong negative response to real appreciation during this period. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms for small and young firms are positive, which implies that the 
negative  impact  of  real  appreciation  in  domestic  currency  is  less  vigorous  on  the  price-cost 
margins of these group of firms. The effect of real appreciation on foreign partner firms’ price-
cost margins appears to be also negative. Given the high share of imported intermediate and 
capital goods in industrial production in Turkey, which reflects a significant level of dependency 
on imported inputs, foreign exchange occurs as one of the most important constituents of the non-
labor  costs.  Therefore,  an  appreciation  of  domestic  currency  reduces  the  real non-labor costs 
through lowering input costs, which allows the firms to charge lower profit margins. The fact that 
we find a negative relationship between real appreciation and price-cost margins also for the 
exporter firms suggests that competitiveness losses arising from real appreciation is outweighed 
by the reductions in imported input costs for trade-oriented firms. These findings are consistent 
with  those  of  Onaran  and  Yentürk  (2003),  which  finds  a  negative  relationship  between  real 
exchange rate and mark-up rates in the Turkish manufacturing industry for the period of 1980 to 
1995 and that the decrease in competitiveness has been more than offset by lower real non-lobar 
inputs during the 1989-1993 period. 
V. Conclusion 
In  this  study,  we  analyzed  the  determinants  of  the  price-cost  margins  in  the  Turkish 
manufacturing  industry  during  1995-2003,  using  panel  data  econometric  techniques  by 
conditioning on firms’ market size, age, financial position, ownership and export shares. The 
results of the empirical analysis show that, import penetration has not produced the expected 
competitive effects in the domestic commodity markets for large, high market share and foreign 
                                                 
6 It is evident that the rise in a firm’s indebtness reduces the price-cost margins of that firm via the increase in interest 
payments. In that respect, our finding is consistent with this fact, since the definition of price-cost margin in this 
study excludes interest payments. Nevertheless, the aim of the analysis herein is to control the effect of various firm 
groups’ financial positions (leverage) on these firms’ price-cost margins.   20
partner firms. In fact, this result implies the presence of a possible implicit collusion among 
domestic  and  foreign  firms  in  more  concentrated  industries,  or,  alternatively,  importers  and 
domestic manufacturing firms may the parts of same firms. Actually, the fact that the high market 
share and foreign partner firms have the highest rates of import penetration, respectively lends 
support to the above-mentioned arguments for the Turkish case. 
In most of the cases in our analysis, we found significant differences in the behaviors of price-
cost  margins  of  the  firms  according  to  their  market  size.  More  specifically,  pricing  behavior 
differs substantially across firms as to whether a firm has market power or not. These differences 
are revealed evidently in the classification of small and large firms in our analysis, which in fact 
represents fragmented and segmented sectors, respectively. We observe that, small firms’ price-
cost margins behave counter-cyclically while large firms’ are pro-cyclical. We found that interest 
income, in general, has a positive impact on price-cost margins of all groups of firms, but less 
vigorous for small, exporter and young firms. Labor productivity also negatively affects the price-
cost margins of small firms, while there is, in general, a positive impact for large firms. On the 
other hand, the effect of exporting activity was found to be negative for high market power firms, 
but positive for small firms. Real appreciation of domestic currency generally reduces the price-
cost margins of all firm groups, but the impact on small firms is less pronounced. A general 
conclusion arising from these observations is that the price-cost margins of small and large firms 
behave fairly in the opposite direction in response to the changes in some specific variables. As a 
result,  given  the  high  level  of  concentration  in  the  industrial  commodity  markets  in  Turkey, 
market  size  appears  to  be  the  most  important  determinant  of  the  price-cost  margins  in  the 
manufacturing industry.   21
Appendix A: Some Characteristics of the Turkish Manufacturing Industry According to 
Market Taxonomy 
Table A1: Cyclicality 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  11.8  12.2  13.4  9.6  14.7  13.2 
1996  0.0  2.7  2.4  3.3  4.6  3.4 
1997  12.2  14.3  12.6  11.3  14.2  11.8 
1998  11.1  10.9  11.5  11.2  10.3  9.7 
1999  0.9  -0.7  -0.8  2.8  -5.0  -1.4 
2000  1.4  0.5  -0.8  4.8  -2.6  1.8 
2001  -9.6  -10.5  -8.1  -10.7  -7.6  -12.0 
2002  -5.9  -5.5  -5.1  -5.8  -4.3  -6.5 
2003  -3.5  -2.9  -3.1  -5.0  -2.5  -2.3 
1995-2003  2.2  2.6  2.5  2.7  2.5  2.2 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
 
 
Table A2: Market Share 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  1.2  10.5  1.1  12.4  4.0  10.9 
1996  1.2  10.6  1.4  12.4  4.0  11.4 
1997  1.2  10.9  1.5  12.6  4.1  12.1 
1998  1.2  11.2  1.7  13.0  4.4  12.6 
1999  1.4  12.4  2.0  14.7  5.0  14.2 
2000  1.0  11.0  1.7  12.6  4.3  13.0 
2001  1.3  13.8  2.2  16.0  5.9  14.7 
2002  1.4  12.1  2.1  14.2  5.2  13.5 
2003  1.4  12.3  2.2  14.5  5.3  14.8 
1995-2003  1.2  11.6  1.8  13.5  4.7  13.0 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
 
 
Table A3: Import Penetration 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  42.4  27.5  27.7  54.9  25.8  37.6 
1996  56.7  40.6  39.7  71.7  33.0  50.6 
1997  59.6  40.9  41.3  84.1  32.3  54.1 
1998  50.2  37.9  36.1  63.3  29.6  49.1 
1999  48.7  36.2  33.6  64.5  27.1  48.0 
2000  50.0  39.3  36.4  60.0  31.9  52.0 
2001  56.4  39.6  39.9  73.0  33.9  50.9 
2002  50.4  37.9  37.7  64.6  31.3  46.0 
2003  48.8  38.9  37.9  65.8  29.5  47.1 
1995-2003  51.5  37.7  36.7  66.9  30.5  48.4 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations   22
 
Table A4: Interest Income 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  0.4  1.6  0.4  1.6  0.8  2.0 
1996  0.9  1.5  0.6  1.6  1.1  3.0 
1997  0.5  1.5  0.7  1.3  1.0  1.9 
1998  0.5  2.0  0.8  1.7  1.1  1.8 
1999  1.0  2.5  1.2  2.4  1.8  2.5 
2000  0.6  1.7  0.7  1.5  1.0  1.8 
2001  1.4  2.3  1.0  2.7  1.5  2.6 
2002  0.8  1.3  0.4  1.5  0.7  1.1 
2003  0.4  1.0  0.5  1.1  0.6  1.0 
1995-2003  0.7  1.7  0.7  1.7  1.1  2.0 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
 
 
Table A5: Export Share 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  11.5  27.9  23.4  21.0  53.3  26.2 
1996  11.8  29.2  24.2  22.3  55.4  28.7 
1997  12.9  29.7  25.0  22.8  56.5  29.1 
1998  13.5  31.5  26.2  24.8  59.5  28.9 
1999  13.9  33.8  27.5  26.2  62.5  30.7 
2000  13.9  32.0  26.7  25.3  59.6  29.6 
2001  16.8  42.1  32.2  34.8  66.7  38.9 
2002  16.5  37.1  29.2  31.1  62.7  34.8 
2003  16.9  35.6  27.8  30.1  59.9  33.7 
1995-2003  14.1  33.0  26.9  26.3  59.5  31.0 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
 
 
Table A6: Labor Productivity 
   Small  Large  Young  HMS  Exporters  FDI 
1995  3.2  3.4  2.9  5.0  3.4  5.1 
1996  3.4  3.3  2.6  5.2  2.9  4.7 
1997  3.3  3.7  2.6  5.7  3.1  4.8 
1998  2.9  3.7  2.6  5.7  2.8  5.5 
1999  3.0  3.6  2.8  5.4  2.8  5.1 
2000  3.0  3.7  2.9  5.7  3.1  5.7 
2001  4.9  4.0  3.6  6.7  4.1  7.3 
2002  3.1  4.2  2.9  6.4  3.3  6.0 
2003  3.1  3.7  2.8  5.5  2.7  5.9 
1995-2003  3.3  3.7  2.9  5.7  3.1  5.5 
         Source: State Institute of Statistics and our own calculations 
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Appendix B: Estimation Results 
Table B1: Estimation Results with No Interaction Variables and for Small Firms 
  No Interaction Variables  Small Firms 
  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003 
CYCL  0.013***  0.006  0.006  0.019***  0.006  0.024* 
  (3.38)  (1.31)  (0.53)  (4.10)  (1.19)  (1.67) 
MMSH  0.071***  0.149***  0.212***  0.078***  0.150***  0.201*** 
  (3.36)  (4.21)  (3.29)  (3.67)  (4.22)  (3.05) 
IMP  0.006***  0.006***  0.007**  0.011***  0.009***  0.024*** 
  (3.69)  (2.80)  (2.27)  (4.56)  (3.16)  (5.01) 
INTINCS  0.354***  0.355***  0.309***  0.463***  0.448***  0.470*** 
  (31.14)  (24.39)  (14.50)  (27.77)  (23.74)  (9.65) 
EXPSH  0.006**  0.007  0.007  0.002  0.004  -0.001 
  (2.00)  (1.62)  (0.96)  (0.41)  (0.70)  (0.12) 
EMPPR  -0.011**  -0.016  -0.007  0.008  0.057***  -0.005 
  (2.22)  (1.34)  (1.08)  (0.89)  (3.00)  (0.23) 
LEVER  -0.064***  -0.065***  -0.062***  -0.077***  -0.075***  -0.077*** 
  (22.86)  (17.38)  (10.00)  (20.57)  (15.22)  (8.46) 
RDKUF  -0.143***  -0.248***  -0.047***  -0.154***  -0.287***  -0.050*** 
  (21.36)  (20.77)  (7.99)  (20.59)  (21.00)  (6.44) 
CYCL*TYPE  _  _  _  -0.013**  -0.003  -0.033 
        (1.98)  (0.36)  (1.43) 
MMSH*TYPE  _  _  _  -0.326*  0.156  0.444 
        (1.87)  (0.61)  (1.12) 
IMP*TYPE  _  _  _  -0.008**  -0.006  -0.027*** 
        (2.51)  (1.43)  (4.40) 
INTINCS*TYPE  _  _  _  -0.205***  -0.228***  -0.181*** 
        (9.00)  (7.73)  (3.30) 
EXPSH*TYPE  _  _  _  0.014**  0.009  0.020 
        (2.15)  (1.00)  (1.31) 
EMPPR*TYPE  _  _  _  -0.028***  -0.127***  -0.004 
        (2.61)  (5.10)  (0.17) 
LEVER*TYPE  _  _  _  0.029***  0.024***  0.026** 
        (5.22)  (3.24)  (2.05) 
RDKUF*TYPE  _  _  _  0.029***  0.111***  0.006 
        (3.06)  (5.35)  (0.49) 
Constant  25.949***  36.273***  13.254***  25.874***  36.085***  13.173*** 
  (32.40)  (27.70)  (15.32)  (32.33)  (27.55)  (15.06) 
Observations  23988  16248  7740  23988  16248  7740 
No. of Firms   5494  5041  3396  5494  5041  3396 
R-squared  0.11  0.12  0.09  0.11  0.12  0.10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
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Table B2: Estimation Results for Large Firms and Young  Firms 
  Large Firms  Young Firms 
  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003 
CYCL  0.008*  0.001  -0.004  0.026***  0.011**  0.031** 
  (1.92)  (0.21)  (0.36)  (5.36)  (2.07)  (2.05) 
CYCL*TYPE  0.037***  0.028***  0.058*  -0.030***  -0.010  -0.065*** 
  (4.20)  (2.59)  (1.72)  (4.64)  (1.35)  (2.89) 
MMSH  0.176***  0.405***  0.642***  0.047**  0.105***  0.361*** 
  (3.29)  (4.77)  (4.64)  (2.04)  (2.74)  (3.91) 
MMSH*TYPE  -0.106*  -0.294***  -0.445***  0.107**  0.165*  -0.279** 
  (1.83)  (3.16)  (2.80)  (1.98)  (1.71)  (2.16) 
IMP  0.006***  0.005**  0.006**  0.011***  0.009***  0.012*** 
  (3.22)  (2.54)  (1.99)  (5.43)  (3.70)  (3.45) 
IMP*TYPE  0.008  0.002  0.020  -0.015***  -0.009**  -0.018*** 
  (1.26)  (0.24)  (1.52)  (4.28)  (2.27)  (2.85) 
INTINCS  0.320***  0.312***  0.317***  0.385***  0.416***  0.314*** 
  (26.01)  (19.47)  (14.35)  (29.82)  (25.51)  (14.07) 
INTINCS*TYPE  0.227***  0.245***  0.101  -0.138***  -0.285***  -0.060 
  (7.20)  (6.56)  (1.13)  (5.12)  (8.03)  (0.77) 
EXPSH  0.008***  0.008*  0.011  0.000  0.002  -0.009 
  (2.59)  (1.81)  (1.45)  (0.08)  (0.32)  (0.75) 
EXPSH*TYPE  -0.023***  -0.018  -0.044*  0.011*  0.010  0.026* 
  (2.61)  (1.56)  (1.69)  (1.88)  (1.16)  (1.74) 
EMPPR  -0.018***  -0.045***  -0.006  -0.005  0.020  -0.005 
  (3.09)  (3.48)  (0.91)  (0.75)  (1.12)  (0.69) 
EMPPR*TYPE  0.026**  0.208***  -0.263***  -0.018*  -0.061**  -0.013 
  (2.01)  (5.22)  (3.99)  (1.66)  (2.52)  (0.55) 
LEVER  -0.057***  -0.058***  -0.059***  -0.066***  -0.066***  -0.056*** 
  (19.12)  (14.81)  (9.13)  (17.45)  (13.65)  (6.06) 
LEVER*TYPE  -0.067***  -0.055***  -0.047**  0.005  0.005  -0.009 
  (7.55)  (4.66)  (2.13)  (0.82)  (0.67)  (0.72) 
RDKUF  -0.139***  -0.223***  -0.046***  -0.154***  -0.301***  -0.042*** 
  (19.73)  (17.64)  (7.34)  (19.82)  (21.62)  (4.80) 
RDKUF*TYPE  -0.033***  -0.152***  -0.000  0.027***  0.147***  -0.007 
  (2.58)  (5.91)  (0.00)  (2.92)  (7.23)  (0.64) 
Constant  25.935***  36.046***  12.907***  25.671***  35.268***  13.078*** 
  (32.45)  (27.64)  (14.74)  (31.93)  (26.86)  (14.96) 
Observations  23988  16248  7740  23988  16248  7740 
No. of  Firms  5494  5041  3396  5494  5041  3396 
R-squared  0.11  0.13  0.10  0.11  0.13  0.10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
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Table B3: Estimation Results for High Market Share Firms and Exporter Firms 
  High Market Share Firms  Exporter Firms 
  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003 
CYCL  0.006  0.000  -0.009  0.016***  0.008  0.014 
  (1.33)  (0.10)  (0.71)  (3.46)  (1.54)  (0.95) 
CYCL*TYPE  0.030***  0.032***  0.038  -0.013**  -0.011  -0.035 
  (3.74)  (3.15)  (1.30)  (2.02)  (1.39)  (1.53) 
MMSH  0.293***  0.427***  0.592***  0.056**  0.132***  0.200** 
  (4.33)  (4.06)  (3.68)  (2.38)  (3.22)  (2.56) 
MMSH*TYPE  -0.226***  -0.293***  -0.422**  0.061  0.061  -0.042 
  (3.18)  (2.63)  (2.39)  (1.17)  (0.77)  (0.30) 
IMP  0.005*  0.007*  -0.004  0.004**  0.005**  0.004 
  (1.84)  (1.71)  (0.87)  (2.17)  (2.06)  (0.94) 
IMP*TYPE  0.002  0.002  0.017***  0.007*  0.005  0.006 
  (0.66)  (0.36)  (2.78)  (1.89)  (1.02)  (1.00) 
INTINCS  0.314***  0.312***  0.300***  0.383***  0.405***  0.311*** 
  (25.68)  (20.28)  (12.93)  (28.84)  (23.94)  (13.59) 
INTINCS*TYPE  0.298***  0.398***  0.065  -0.107***  -0.184***  -0.030 
  (9.18)  (8.74)  (1.05)  (4.18)  (5.58)  (0.48) 
EXPSH  0.011***  0.013***  0.011  0.002  0.010  -0.005 
  (3.33)  (2.96)  (1.43)  (0.30)  (1.29)  (0.41) 
EXPSH*TYPE  -0.035***  -0.049***  -0.034  0.006  -0.003  0.012 
  (3.85)  (3.91)  (1.51)  (0.98)  (0.33)  (0.80) 
EMPPR  -0.011**  -0.025*  -0.006  -0.004  0.010  -0.005 
  (2.09)  (1.82)  (0.92)  (0.77)  (0.66)  (0.67) 
EMPPR*TYPE  -0.015  0.013  -0.020  -0.050***  -0.080***  -0.039 
  (0.93)  (0.44)  (0.81)  (3.44)  (3.07)  (1.51) 
LEVER  -0.058***  -0.060***  -0.060***  -0.057***  -0.058***  -0.056*** 
  (19.57)  (15.16)  (9.14)  (17.18)  (13.31)  (7.47) 
LEVER*TYPE  -0.051***  -0.038***  -0.018  -0.025***  -0.025***  -0.022 
  (5.96)  (3.35)  (0.89)  (4.04)  (3.00)  (1.61) 
RDKUF  -0.144***  -0.236***  -0.044***  -0.130***  -0.237***  -0.027*** 
  (20.42)  (18.27)  (6.96)  (17.60)  (17.56)  (3.68) 
RDKUF*TYPE  -0.017  -0.089***  -0.003  -0.045***  -0.038*  -0.063*** 
  (1.27)  (3.42)  (0.21)  (4.50)  (1.81)  (5.11) 
Constant  26.092***  36.170***  12.926***  26.114***  36.561***  13.470*** 
  (32.65)  (27.51)  (14.64)  (32.41)  (27.84)  (15.33) 
Observations  23988  16248  7740  23988  16248  7740 
No. of  Firms  5494  5041  3396  5494  5041  3396 
R-squared  0.11  0.13  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.10 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
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Table B4: Estimation Results for Foreign Partner Firms and Public Firms 
  Foreign Partner Firms  Public Firms 
  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003  1995-2003  1995-2000  2001-2003 
CYCL  0.011***  0.005  0.009  0.013***  0.006  0.006 
  (2.84)  (1.03)  (0.80)  (3.40)  (1.26)  (0.50) 
CYCL*TYPE  0.013  0.013  0.029  -0.044  -0.055  4.916 
  (1.14)  (0.89)  (0.72)  (0.67)  (0.79)  (0.97) 
MMSH  0.137***  0.201***  0.199***  0.069***  0.144***  0.213*** 
  (4.17)  (4.03)  (2.68)  (3.25)  (4.07)  (3.30) 
MMSH*TYPE  -0.083*  -0.064  0.016  3.860***  5.756***  1.365 
  (1.95)  (0.91)  (0.11)  (3.62)  (2.96)  (0.33) 
IMP  0.006***  0.005***  0.007**  0.006***  0.006***  0.007** 
  (3.32)  (2.61)  (2.27)  (3.65)  (2.72)  (2.27) 
IMP*TYPE  0.009  0.011  0.016  0.105**  0.183***  1.143 
  (1.45)  (1.45)  (1.24)  (1.96)  (3.06)  (1.23) 
INTINCS  0.406***  0.455***  0.285***  0.354***  0.355***  0.309*** 
  (31.35)  (25.12)  (13.28)  (31.10)  (24.35)  (14.50) 
INTINCS*TYPE  -0.224***  -0.284***  0.873***  0.140  0.101  6.006 
  (8.40)  (9.37)  (6.54)  (0.90)  (0.60)  (0.45) 
EXPSH  0.010***  0.010**  0.009  0.006**  0.007  0.007 
  (3.14)  (2.32)  (1.27)  (1.98)  (1.64)  (0.91) 
EXPSH*TYPE  -0.044***  -0.044***  -0.090**  0.059  -0.108  0.042 
  (3.77)  (2.80)  (2.03)  (0.70)  (0.77)  (0.15) 
EMPPR  -0.009*  -0.006  -0.005  -0.011**  -0.016  -0.007 
  (1.67)  (0.46)  (0.83)  (2.23)  (1.35)  (1.08) 
EMPPR*TYPE  -0.064**  -0.125***  -0.058  -4.035**  -3.368  0.000 
  (2.46)  (2.75)  (1.12)  (2.11)  (1.33)  (.) 
LEVER  -0.059***  -0.061***  -0.056***  -0.064***  -0.064***  -0.062*** 
  (20.57)  (15.95)  (8.83)  (22.64)  (17.04)  (10.00) 
LEVER*TYPE  -0.083***  -0.076***  -0.097***  -0.196***  -0.252***  0.657 
  (6.87)  (4.57)  (3.43)  (3.62)  (4.07)  (0.65) 
RDKUF  -0.144***  -0.250***  -0.047***  -0.143***  -0.247***  -0.047*** 
  (21.03)  (20.44)  (7.78)  (21.29)  (20.72)  (8.00) 
RDKUF*TYPE  -0.013  -0.012  -0.014  0.073  0.066  -1.895 
  (0.77)  (0.36)  (0.57)  (0.62)  (0.30)  (0.74) 
Constant  26.029***  36.546***  13.419***  25.834***  36.056***  13.452*** 
  (32.61)  (28.03)  (15.48)  (32.25)  (27.52)  (14.30) 
Observations  23988  16248  7740  23988  16248  7740 
No. of  Firms  5494  5041  3396  5494  5041  3396 
R-squared  0.11  0.13  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.09 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%               27
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